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SIR STAFFORD COMES TO INDIA
By H. RAMIAH
During the Last few weeks, which saw a temporary cessation of
,(arge'scale fighting. the politicaL interest of the world centered around
India. The fate oj more than 350 million Indians hung in the baLance.
In spito of the conflicting news. tho facts about tho present
slrllggle in India are clear: India, 11.71 dc,' B'dtish ruLe again8t her will
a1ld hence forced to participate indirectly i,~ the war, wants independllnce
today more urgentLy tha1. ever, not only for its own sake but aLBa in
-Drder to ucape from being drawn directly into the war. Great Britain,
011 the other hand, has the grEatest intllrest in keeping this nwst
1>recious jewel in the British crown. Site is ready to promise much for
the future if only she can have the support of India's men and mater'ials
,in her desperate struDoLll today. Finally, the Axis nat'ions are out to
.destroy the military pO'wer of the British ElIIp-ire wheTever they find it
- even in India, as 10110 as it remains there. Hence, while Britain
.wants a British Ind-ia, the Indians as well as the Azis powers want an
I/ldia free from British domination.
London has PostlJOned the facing of the Indian issue to the last
1JOssibie moment. Only afl,er Rangoon, the gateway to India, had fallen
into the hands of Japan, d'id the British GoveTnment decide that some-
thing had to be done. Sir Stalfo'rd Cripps was sent to India 1lJith a'll
olfe'r which 10as, as usual, "toc> little and too late." He has lost the first
round: he declared in the beginning that the Indians .would have to
-accept or reject the British plan as a whole. The Ind-ians did not accept
it. Yet Sir Stafford remained for further neDotiations.
The purllose of the following articLe is not to save our readers the
trouble of reading their dally papers and of stlldy'ino Sir Stafford's
platl and the Indian answers. Its purpose is rather to analyze India's
1Josit-ion, from which her decisions and actions are grcrwing. The autho'r
is the Far Eastllrn correspondent of many Indian newspapers, incLuding
"The Bomba-II Chronicle," "The Hindu," "The Natiotlal HeraLd," "The
Hindustan Standard," and a man who is personally fam'iliar with the
lteading figures of India toda7l. His article is WTitte1l from the point of
v-iew of an Indian nat-ionaList.-K. M.
'WHAT the British have been calling
the outposts of the Indian Empire,
namely, Egypt, Burma, and Malaya, are
all either seriously menaced or in their
opponents' hands. The fall of Malaya
and Rangoon occurred in such quick
succession that the British hardly have
time to prepare even an improvised de-
fense of India. Strange as it must
seem today, until recently they never
expected a threat to India from the
East. They never took Japan into
serious account. As a result, the de-
fense of the eastern half of India
depends upon a small, semi-expedi-
tionary force coupled with some mobile
units.
FRONTIER WITHOUT DEFENSE
There are four military commands
in India, known as the North, South,
East, and West Commands, but all
stationed in the Northwest or in re-
gions close to the Northwest of India.
The reason for this was that the Brit-
ish always feared an attack on India
from that direction, either by the
Russians or by mountain tribes. Hence
an area covering the larger part of India
and situated to the southeast of the
line Delhi/Bombay has practically no
defense arrangements. The 60,000 Brit-
ish and 150,000 Indian troops (besides
about 35,000 reservists) constituting the
peace-time army of India were meant
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to be a field army and a first·line
defense to cover the general mobiliza-
tion in the case of an emergency. As
a reason for this strategy the British
pointed to the 72 expeditions they bad
been forced to make against tribesmen
between 1850 and 1922, and they main-
tained that the defense of the North.
west means the defense of India. This
calculation was a serious mistake.
Jlnother factor of great influence in
the War of Greater East Asia is the
steady pounding to which the British
have been subjected by the Germans
since the autumn of 1939, by which the
main military strength of the British has
been weakened beyond immediate re-
pair. The British have been putting
up a bluff in our part of the world,
making more of Singapore than it ever
was. The Indian troops stationed in
Singapore, except for a small section,
were not a well-trained army. Most
of them did not know the meaning of
artillery, since it is the policy of the
British to train only a limited part of
the Indian Army in the use of artillery.
That limited artillery-trained part was
serving in Egypt, Iran, etc., and the
freshly recruited men brought to Singa-
pore were trained only as drivers of
military lorries and trucks. Moreover,
the propaganda of the Indian National
Congress, to which these recruits had
been subjected while they were still
villagers, had already had its share in
demoralizing them against aiding the
British.
It is no wonder that, when the well-
trained, well-equipped, and enthusiastic
Japanese forces attacked Singapore,
the British defense fell to pieces in no
time. This is what is likely to happen
in the defense of India also. It has
already been the case in Burma.
The British assertions that there are
large defense arrangements along the
Indian border arc propaganda. Sup-
plies of arms from the British Isles
cannot reach India, and the Indian
armament factories cannot produce any-
thing beyond rifles and simple machine
guns. Even the precision parts of the
latter have to be imported from Britain.
As for the manufacture of airplanes in
India, this is a myth. An assembly
plant for parts imported from America
has been opened. But can America
supply planes to all parts of the world?
If so, why were the British short of
planes for the defense of Malaya '/
And the one manufacturing center that
was inaugurated last year in Bangalore
is still in an embryonic state.
TWO FORGES
With this threatening situation obtain-
ing to the east of India, it is of great
interest to study the events taking place
inside India, especially as the Axis
powers have declared that they are
willing to help India achieve her inde-
pendence.
There are two main forces to be
considered within India. On the one
hand are the British, who are making
every effort to survive this war as an
empire and to retain India in their
hands, even at the cost of every other
possession they hold in the East. For
it was India through which they got
Burma, Malaya, Hongkong l etc.) and
could stabilize their hold on South
Africa. From Aden to Capetown, from
Karachi to Hongkong, it was the Indian
sepoy who guarded the British interests,
and it was the money of the Indian
taxpayer which financed the expeditions
that conquered all those territories. If
England can manage to retain India in
the present crisis, her future may not
be so hopeless. With this in mind, the
British are applying all their skill to
line up the Indian people with the
British cause and for the defense of
India.
The other force are the Indian na-
tionalists, who for years have been
yearning to free their country from
the British and have been patiently
working toward that purpose. Gandhi's
leadership of the Indian National
Congress in its fight against the British
dates back to 1920. The intensity and
fervor with which he has been fighting
have never waned during the last
twenty-two years. The fact that he
started a CiviI Disobedience movement
in India in October 1940, in the midst
of Britain's entanglement in the present
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war, should be enough to show his
determination and the aim he has in
view.
HOW WILL INDIA'S
LEADERS ACT?
There bas been much speculation
recently about the possibility of the
Indian national leaders now throwing
their weight on the side of the British
in order to fight Japan. This is an
idea that may seem natural to those
who have the one desire of seeing Japan
beaten in the War of Greater East
Asia. But to a serious student of Indian
affairs it is an idea that is, to say the
least, amazing.
The actions of the Indian national
leaders are influenced by one main
consideration, that of India's advantage.
What are the benefits to be derived for
India by their joining the British side?
And what are her prospects if the
Indian nationalists do not throw in
their lot with the British? By weighing
the answers to these questions we shall
discover the likely attitude of the
Indian leaders. And we should bear in
mind that these leaders are no children
in British politics, to be cajoled with
sweet promises. Their attitude will be
governed by the consideration, whether
Britain is at all in a position to carry
out her possible offers and to maintain
whatever would be the new position.
This is perhaps the place to mention
that the demands of the Indian na-
tionalists were not born out of the
present circumstances, and that the
nationalists have no intention of making
political bargains. In 1929, when the
Indian National Congress first passed
a resolution demanding immediate
recognition of India's independence, the
British were not involved in any war
or internal troubles. And as for
political bargains, there were many
offers made by the British of late which
have been entirely disregarded by the
Indian nationalists. Since it is clear
that the most opportune time has
arrived for India to gain complete
independence, there is no reason for
the Congress leaders to go back to the
l)oint making of political bargains with
a Britain that bas been defeated again
and again in all her battles.
NEHRU'S ATTITUDE
During the last fourteen months
many thousands of Indians under the
banner of Gandhi were jailed because
they have made it impossible for the
British to mobilize a sufficiently big
army in India. And thirty-two mem-
bers of provincial governments went
to jail for the same reason, having
spoilt all British hopes .for their war
efforts. Since the very beginning of
the war in 1939, Indian nationalists
have declared that they have nothing
to do with British wars and that they
should be left alone.
Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, declaring
the non-eo-operation of the National
Congress in British wars, and especially
in the present war of huge arma-
ments, said in a statement in June
1940: "I should personally like to say
that this war and the events that
preceded it have impressed me more
than ever with the futility of violence.
And in India, as her circumstances
are today, the idea of our organizing
violence for defense against external
aggression of a major power is futile.
We cannot do so effectively, at least
in this present crisis, and in any
event we are not going to do so in
order to help an empire that dominates
over us."
Nehru's statement clearly brings out
two points: that the Indian nationalists
do not think in terms of defending
India by means of the British army
in India, but, having no organized
force of their own, would rather not
fight at all against any major power;
and secondly that under no circum-
stances will they fight for British
imperialism.
A further quotation from that same
statement would seem to indicate that
in an indirect way Nehru expresses
his hopes of India being treated as a
neutral by other powers. He said:
"I do not think there is the slightest
likelihood of a major invasion of
India." That Nehru, in the midst of
war, should say this can only mean
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that he would rather choose to be
friendly with the outside powers than
be an ally of the British. One should
bear in mind that Gandhi, Nehru, and
the other nationalist leaders must act
and speak under the noses of British
guns, which naturally calls for very
careful tactics and language. There
is much to indicate that the great
powers have understood the attitude
of the Indian leaders.
ARE THEY ANTI-JAPANESE?
Yet there are still many people who
believe that the Indian National Con-
gress and Nehru are anti-Japanese.
The origin of this misunderstanding
lies several years back, in the early
days of the Sino-Japanese confHct. At
that time not only Jehru but educated
Indians in general thought that Japan
and Britain would come to terms over
the partition of Asia, so that Britain's
imperialist policy would be allowed to
continue undisturbed in India in ex-
change for Japan's annexation of
China. This view was strengthened
when it b'ecame known that the British
seemed willing to accede to the Japa-
nese demand for closure of the Burma
Road (which was later actually closed
for three months). The Indians, who
had been fighting the British so long
for the independence of their country,
were alarmed at the thought that
Japan was going to be an imperialistic
partner of Britain and hence expressed
open sympathy with China.
Indians have always felt antagonistic
towards any power that became
friendly with Britain. That is why
the Indians today are looking with
suspicion toward the USSR, the ally
of Britain. So the apparent friend-
ship between Britain and Japan was
looked upon with disfavor. India
desired a break between Britain and
Japan, which indeed occurred later
when the Burma Road was opened
again. Britain's switch resulted in the
so-called ABCD encirclement directed
at Japan.
CHIANG KAI·SHEK'S VISIT
The British invitation to Generalissimo
Chiang Kai-shek to meet the Indian
national leaders is another move by the
British to instill fear of Britain's op-
ponents into the Indians. However, it
seems this scheme fell through, as we
assume that the Generalissimo found a
great lack of statesmanship on the
part of the British, quite aside from
there being neither strategy nor solidity
in the British defenses. The silence
that the Generalissimo has maintained
ever since he returned from India
shows that he must have grave doubts
as to British methods and practices
there.
Moreover, Indian leaders will not be
induced to sacrifice the interests of
India's cause of freedom for the con-
venience of other individuals or the
British. The Indians know from bitter
experience how great a mistake it was
to help Britain during the Great War.
The problems of Chiang Kai-shek are
rather beyond aid on the part of India,
which is a subject country fighting for
its independence without any army or
weapons whatever. Furthermore, the
Indian National Congress would not
think of making India an enemy of the
Axis powers, which have declared their
sympathy with India's aim of becoming
a nation free of all domination. So it
was quite natural for the Indian national
leaders to have honored and feted
the Generalissimo as a distinguished
guest but to have taken leave of
him without further commitments.
This, as well as the fact that the
Indian national leaders did not ask
the Indian troops in Malaya to resist
the Japanese, should demonstrate clearly
enough that they wish to remain aloof
from British entanglements.
OTHER POWERS TO RULE INDIA?
Does this mean, as some critics
interpret it, that the Indians would
welcome any other power to rule India
in place of Britain? No Indian of
the present generation would seriously
consider this possibility. The powers
who appear to be gaining the upper
hand in this war have assured
India that she will be allowed to
assume her rightful position and that
there will be an "India for the Indians."
--:-
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And no matter how things turn out
on the Russian front, the USSR will
not have sufficient strength left to
annex other countries.
British and American propaganda
has done its best to raise fears in the
hearts of the Indians that either Japan
or Germany will try to dominate India,
should the British be defeated. Though
apprehension on this account caused
anxiety among the Indians for some
time, it is hardly suitable that these
apprehensions be raised by the British,
the very ones to have exerted domination
over India. As early as the end of
1!l40, Gandhi reacted to this propaganda
in his own peculiar way. Addressing
the Indians, he said: "You will invite
Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini to
take what they want. If these gen-
tlemen desire to occupy your homes,
you will vacate them. If they do not
give you free passage out, you will
allow yourselves - men, women, and
children-to be slaughtered." From that
day onwards the British ceased direct
propaganda. and adopted other methods.
BRITISH STATESMEN W AXE UP
Recent utterances by Premier Tojo
of Japan as well as Berlin press
dispatches regarding India have stirred
British statesmen out of their usual
complacency. They have finally at this
late hour become alive to the realities
of the Indian situation. In consterna-
tion and haste they are making new
proposals to India every day. They
thought first of dispatching Sir Archibald
Sinclair, the British Liberal, to India to
try his Liberal balm on the Indians,
although on many previous occasions,
including that of Sir John Simon's
visit in 1928, the British Liberals had
failed to make any impression on
nationalist India.
In the end Prime Minister Churchill
must have been made to see the
uselessness of sending a Liberal to
India, whereupon another delegate was
chosen in the person of Sir Stafford
Cripps. But again it would be er-
roneous to assume that Sir Stafford
is able to make any deep impres-
sion on the Congress leaders. As
in the case of Generalissimo Chiang
Kai-shek, Prime Minister Churchill is
trying ostentatiously to work through
personalities who are reputed to be
friends of Nehru, so that a false im-
pression may arise in the camp of
Britain's opponents.
IMPERIAL COMMUNIST
Sir Stafford Cripps, a British
Socialist (or rather Communist), is at
heart an Imperialist. If he were a
true socialist or communist he would
never have accepted this mission to
India, since it means an effort to
preserve the British Empire, a thing
contrary to the tenets of his professed
creed. That he is an Imperialist be-
came clear to the Indians during his
last visit there in December 1939,
shortly after the outbreak of the
present war. He came as a so-called
friend of Indian support for the
British war effort.
He failed to convince the Indian
leaders that he was free of the
psychology of British Imperialism, and
there was a general sentiment in
Congress circles against accepting Sir
Stafford's professions and offers of
friendship towards India, as he was
obviously interested in the Empire
first and last. His socialism was recog-
nized as nothing but a reaction against
the ruling political clique in England
and its grasp upon the riches of the
Empire. Thus his true aim was a
more equitable distribution of Empire
spoils among Britons rather than the
abolishment of British Imperialism.
PROMISES, PROMISES!
I had an opportunity to interview
Sir Stafford at Allahabad in 1939. At
the time he said that the greatest
interest in Indian affairs was being
taken by Parliamentarians in England,
and that an influential group favorable
to Indian aspirations was growing in
the House of Commons. He also said
that representatives of different poli-
tical groups in Parliament would visit
India in the course of the following
months. That was two years ago, and
nothing took place to substantiate his
words until the recent Japanese military
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successes made tile British Government
tremble for their country's hold upon
India. The Indian leaders are well
aware that Sir Stafford's promises can
mean little as long as Churchill is at
the head of the British Government.
They have not forgotten that Churchill
refused to see Gandhi when the latter
went to England to attend the Round
Table Conference.
On the occasion of Sir Stafford
Cripps' visit to Allahabad, he addressed
the students of the University of
Allahabad, saying: "In this world it
will not be enough to have planned
economy for the benefit of the common
people of the world, but there should
be a large degree of democratic free-
dom also for the common people in the
new scheme of things. There should
be no personal or sectional interest."
In the two years that have passed
there has been no sign that the
British people have any inclination to
accept Sir Stafford's high ideals. Why.
then, should the people of India give
much heed to any future promises
and fine words from him '1
GLOSSARY OF INDIAN POLITICAL NAMES AND TERMS
All India Hindu Mahasabha-A political
organization having as its object the protec-
tion of the interests of Hindus. Inclined to
co-operate with the British with the ultimate
goal of achieving independence for India.
AU India Moslem League-A llolitical organi-
zation having as its object the protection of
the Moseem interests in India. Favors the
Pakistan Scheme.
All India National Congress Party-A poli-
tical organization comprising representatives
of different religious groups striving for India's
independence. Founded in Bombay in 1886.
Ambedkar~Leader of the depressed classes
of the Hindu community.
Amritsar Massacre-Took place on April
13, 1919, when General Dyer of the British
forces ordered his men to fire into an unarmed
assembly of Indians in Amritsar. 379 people
were killed and 1,200 wounded.
Azad, Maulana AbuJ Kalam-President of the
All India Congress Party, a great Moham-
medan religious leader.
And Moslem League-A political party of
Moslems opposed to the Moslem League but
also striving for India's independence.
Bose, Subhas Chandra-President of the For-
ward Block. At present in Germany.
Bose, Sarat Chandra-Brother of Subhas
Chandra Bose. At'dent member of the For-
ward Block; now imprisoned by the British.
Bose, Ras Behari-FollowerofSubhas Chandra
Bose. j ·ow liVing in Japan and heading the
Indian Freedom Associations operating out-
side of India in Japan, China, Indo-China,
Thailand, Mala~'a, and the Philippines.
Civil Disobedlence-A movement started by
Mahatma Gandhi for non-co-operation with the
British laws in India.
Communal Question-Includes all problems,
political and otherwise, arising from the
different interests. of the various religioua
groups. Stressed by Britain as an explanation
for the necessity of British rule in India.
CODEress-AII India National Congress Party.
Forward Block-Radical wing of the All
India National Congress Party, from which
it seceded under the leadership of Subhas
Chandra Bose. Striving for complete in-
dependence of India without compromise with
the British.
Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchad-Known as
Mahatma Gandhi. Founder of the Civil
Disobedience Movement. Has resigned from the
Congress Party, but retains great influence.
Harijan Movement-Created by Gandhi for
the uplift of the depressed classes of the Hindu
community known as the" Untouchables."
Jayakar, V. D.-A liberal Indian leader and
colleague of Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru.
Jinnab, M.A.-President of tlle All India
Moslem League. Promoter of the Pakistan
Scheme. Former member of the Congress Party.
Johnson, Louls- pecial representutive of
President Roosevelt in India.
Linlitbgow, Lord- Brilish Viceroy of India.
Native States-British term for those Indian
states nominally independent and ruled by
Indian princes but actually vassal states under
British tutelage. They number over 700 and
are of varying sizes.
Nehru, Pandit Jawaharlal-The most in-
fluential member of the Congress Party nnd
all intellectual with leanings toward the
Soviet Union.
New Delhi-Winter capital of India nnd
seat of the British Government in India.
Pakistan-Literally "the country of the
pure." It comprises those territories of India
which are inhabited predominantly by Mo-
hammedans, i.e., the Punjab, Bengal, Aasam,
Sind, Baluchistan. The Pakistan Scheme
urges the formation of a separate Moslem
territory within India as distinguished from
Hindu territories.
Sapru, Sir Tej Bahador-Formerly a member
of the Congress Party. An Indian nation-
alist leader of the moderate class leaning
toward co-operation with Britain.
Savarkar, V.D.-A great Indian nationalist,
president of the All India Hindu Mahasabba.
Swaraj-Properly "Purna Swaraj," meaning
"absolute independence."
Wanll, Sir Archibald-Commander in Crud
of the AIlied forces in India and Burma.
